Berkshire Hathaway is buying more Delta Air Lines and I think there's a fascinating story behind why Warren Buffett and his successors keep getting drawn back into the airline business.
Berkshire's latest 13F filing, released late Monday, showed it increased its stake in Delta by 7.13 million shares in the third quarter, or 12.4%, bringing its total holdings to 64.45 million shares, or nearly 10% of the company.
That's the third consecutive quarter Berkshire has built its position. It started with 39.8 million shares at the end of March, increased that to 57.3 million in June and has now added another 7.1 million.
This isn't a small position anymore, and the steady accumulation suggests growing conviction even as the war in Iran and fuel price spike have hurt airline economics.
What's particularly interesting is Berkshire's long and tortured history with airlines.
Buffett famously described himself as an "aeroholic" and joked about having a telephone hotline to stop him from buying airline stocks. He also repeated the old joke that the fastest way to become a millionaire was to start as a billionaire and buy an airline.
In his 2007 shareholder letter, he described airlines as the worst kind of business: one that grows rapidly, requires enormous amounts of capital and ultimately earns little or nothing.
Yet Berkshire keeps buying them.
Buffett invested in USAir in 1989, bought major stakes in the four largest US airlines beginning in 2016 and sold them all during the pandemic in 2020 at the bottom. Now Berkshire is back again.
To me, people have always misunderstood Buffett's airline comments.
The aeroholic joke isn't really about hating airlines. It's about loving them too much. Buffett keeps finding reasons to invest in the industry, only to be disappointed by its economics.
And it's easy to understand the attraction.
Airlines have enormous barriers to entry, irreplaceable airport infrastructure, powerful networks and a service that people will continue to need for generations. There is no risk from AI. There is tremendous operating leverage in filling an additional seat on an aircraft that's already scheduled to fly.
Those are precisely the kinds of characteristics that Buffett has spent his career looking for. He likes companies with durable demand, economies of scale, formidable competitive positions and pricing power.
Airlines appear to possess the first three in abundance. Their historical problem is that the fourth — pricing power — has frequently disappeared when competitors added too much capacity.
But what if that's changing?
The railroad comparison
There's a fascinating parallel with another industry that Buffett once avoided: railroads.
For much of their history, railroads were terrible investments. They were capital-intensive, heavily unionized, intensely competitive and chronically unable to earn adequate returns.
Then the industry consolidated, deregulation allowed companies to rationalize their networks, and the economics fundamentally changed.
The tracks were still expensive. The trains still required maintenance. The workers still needed to be paid. But an industry that had destroyed capital for generations suddenly became a tremendous business and a famously good investment for 30 years.
Buffett eventually recognized that transformation as he bought shares Norfold Southern and Union Pacific. Then Berkshire acquired BNSF in 2010 for $44 billion in what was his largest ever acquisition.
Charlie Munger explicitly made the airline comparison at the 2017 Berkshire annual meeting:
"You've got to remember that the railroads were a terrible business for decades and decades and decades and then they got good."
At the Daily Journal meeting that same year, Munger went further, saying that railroads had been terrible for about 80 years before consolidation improved the business, and that something similar was happening in airlines.
That's the part of the Buffett and Munger airline story that tends to get overlooked.
They weren't necessarily saying airlines would always be terrible investments. They were recognizing that an industry with attractive underlying characteristics could eventually develop attractive economics.
The US airline industry has already consolidated dramatically, and there are signs that carriers are increasingly prioritizing profitability over market share.
Delta might be the clearest example.
Delta is becoming a different kind of business
Delta's third-quarter results showed premium ticket revenue rising 18% from a year earlier, reaching $6.82 billion and overtaking main cabin ticket revenue.
Meanwhile, its relationship with American Express continues to become more valuable. Delta expects to receive more than $9 billion in remuneration from American Express this year, supported by its SkyMiles loyalty ecosystem.
Those payments aren't pure profit, but they represent an increasingly important revenue stream tied to customer loyalty and spending rather than simply selling airline seats.
Delta also benefits from dominant hub positions, a premium brand and a customer base that is increasingly willing to pay more for a better travel experience.
It's not difficult to imagine why Berkshire would find those characteristics attractive, particularly given its long history as a major American Express shareholder (perhaps offering visibility into why the partnership works so well for AXP).
The remaining question is whether the industry can sustain that profitability through the next downturn.
Fuel prices, labour costs, aircraft purchases and economic shocks haven't gone away. Airlines still have the ability to undermine one another by adding too much capacity, though I would argue that the wave of new entrants into the space is a thing of the past following the bust of most discount airlines.
Importantly, the distinction from railroads matters. A railroad owns a largely irreplaceable network of tracks, while aircraft can be moved into profitable markets by competitors.
Still, the possibility of a structural transformation is intriguing.
The valuation opportunity
The four major publicly traded North American railroads generally trade around 20–24 times forward earnings, compared with roughly 13 times for Delta.
That's an enormous valuation gap.
If Delta could demonstrate railroad-like durability in its earnings and attract a 20-times multiple on $7.50 in normalized annual earnings per share, the stock would be worth $150, compared with approximately $87 today.
At $9 in annual earnings and the same multiple, it would be worth $180.
Those are illustrative scenarios rather than price targets, and there's no guarantee airlines will ever deserve railroad valuations.
But they show the potential rewards if investors eventually stop thinking about airlines as permanently bad businesses and begin valuing their competitive advantages.
There's one final wrinkle in the Berkshire story. Buffett told the Wall Street Journal in May that he wasn't involved in the renewed Delta investment. Greg Abel became Berkshire's CEO at the beginning of 2026, and the company hasn't publicly identified who directed the subsequent purchases.
So this may not be Buffett himself returning to an old obsession but the investment fits a question that he and Munger wrestled with for decades: Can an industry that has historically destroyed shareholder capital eventually become a wonderful business?
Railroads proved that it can.
And judging by Berkshire's steadily growing investment in Delta, somebody in Omaha thinks airlines might finally be getting there.
This article was written by Adam Button at investinglive.com.提供 MainLink:Investinglive RSS Breaking News Feed